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RIPARIAN OWNERSHIP IN LAKES ANT) PONDS.
INTRODUCTI ON.
A lake is defined by Webster as being a large
body of water, contained in a depression in the earth's
surface, and supplied from the drainage of a more or
less extended area. A pond is defined by the same author
as a body of water, naturally or artificially confined
and usually of less extent than a lake. Angell, in his
work upon Riparian Rights, defines a pond as a lake of
small size. In State vs. Gilman, 14 N. H. 467, Gil-
christ, J., sms the matter up as follows: "The material
difference between a lake and pond is in size; the dis-
tinction, however, as applied to artificial ponds, is
somewhat indefinite. The word pond may mean a natural pond
or an artificial one, raised for manufacturing purposes,
either permanent or temporary. In both cases the limits
of such bodies of water may vary at different times and
seasons by use or natural causes. Therefore, different
rules of construction may apply in different juris-
dictions. " However, as the subject of artificial
ponds will not be touched upon in this thesis, it will
be unnecessary to go further into that particular branch.
"The mere fact that there is a current from a higher to
a lower level, does not make that a river which would
otherwise be a lake, and the fact that a river swells
out into broad, pond like sheets, does not make that a
lake which would otherwise be a river. Where it is ad-
mitted that the water is not a lake nor a pond, the
material difference between which is size, the only
criterion by which to determine whether it is a river,
is the existence of a current. The question cannot be
determined by ascertaining what appellation has been
given it; the name cannot alter the thing." It seems,
therefore, that the main test to distinguish between a
lake arid pond is the question of size.
CHAPTER I.
Did priority of occupation give superior right,
at common law ?
It may perhaps seem that the discussion which fol-
lows upon the common law doctrine of prior appropriation
as giving one an exclusive right to the use of waters,
applies only to running streams, and not, therefore, to
bodies of still water such as lakes and ponds. Such,
however, is not the case. Owing to the peculiar nature
of the country, there are but few strictly non-tidal
lakes to be found in England. There is, therefore, but
little very early law bearing directly upon the subject,
and at this late day, as will be seen later, the ques-
tion as to the title to land under lakes and ponds has
never been directly settled. I think, therefore, that
the discussion which follows will apply as well to lakes
and ponds as to running streams.
The doctrine that one may acquire an exclusive right
to the use of a lake or stream of water in a particular
manner or to a particular extent, by mere prior appro-
priation of it, was at one time quite well founded in
the early English law. One of the earliest cases was
that of Williams vs. Moreland, 2 B & C 913, decided in
1824. The plaintiff in this case was the owner of cer-
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tain land, by reason of which he was entitled to the
use of a stream of water running through the property
and used by him for domestic purposes. The defendant
erected a dam higher up the stream and diverted the
water from its usual course, thereby injuring the plain-
tiff. Bailey, J., in delivering the opinion of the
Court: "My judgment in this case is founded upon the
nature of water, and the manner in which an exclusive
right to its use is obtained. Water is publici juris.
So soon as it is appropriated by an individual, his
right is coextensive with the beneficial use to which he
appropriates it. Subject to that right, all the rest of
the water remains publici juris. The party who obtains
the right to the exclusive enjoyment of the water does so
in derogation of the primitive right of the public. Now
if this be the character of the right to water, a party
complaining of the breach of such right ought to show
that he is prevented from having water which he has
acquired the rirht to use for some beneficial purpose.
In Higgins vs. Iye, 7 Bing. 692, it is held that by the
law of England the person who first appropriates any
part of the water flowing through his own land to his
own use, has the right to the use of so much as he thus
appropriates against any other. In Bradley vs. Shaw, 6
East 207 the doctrine of the superior right of the
first appropriater is recognized, and goes even further
giving the right of other riparian owners to acquire in
the same way a similar priority in the residue left un-
appropriated by the first taker. To the same effect is 2
Blackstone's Commentaries, 402. These cases would seem
to fix the rule that property in water could only be
acquired by appropriation, and the first appropriater
might take it all, to the exclusion of others upon the
same body of water. However, as we proceed, later cases
will show that the rights of riparian owners have a
more substantial foundation than mere appropriation, and
that one rparian owner cannot be deprived of his right
to a just amount of the water by being anticipated in its
use by his neighbor. The leading modern English case
upon this subject is Mason vs. Kill, 5 B & A 1. In this
case the defendant erected a mill on his own land. The
plaintiff's grantor, who was the owner of land below on
the same stream, and had used the water of the stream
twenty years for domestic purposes, gave the defendant
a license to erect his dam at a certain point and to take
what water he pleased. The defendant availed himself of
the license, but the water taken by him was returned into
the stream above plaintiff's land. The defendant, without
license, diverted th'e water of certain springs which
flowed into the stream, and conducted it into a resevoir
for the use of a mill. Later plaintiff erected a mill
upon his land, and appropriated to its use all the sur-
plis water not used by defendant. Later he destroyed
defendant's dam, and gave him notice not to divert the
water. The defendant thereupon erected a new dam lower
down, by means of which aJJ the water at times was di-
verted from plaintiff's mill. Plaintiff brought action
for damages. The opinion, which is very thorough and
contains a review of all the authorities up to this
point, shows that neither the cormmion law nor the civil
law affords any support for the mischievous doctrine, as
it is termed, that the first occupant or appropriater of
water, by his mere priority, acquires such a superior-
ity of riFpht therein as should deprive other riparian
proprieters on the same stream the benefits to be derived
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therefrom. Mr. Chief Justice Denman, who wrote the opin-
ion, goes on to show that the Roman law considered water
as a bonum vacums, in which anyone might acquire a
property; but as public or common in the sense that any
one might apply it to the necessary purposes of support-
ing life, and that no one had any property in water it-
self, except in that particular part which he might ab-
stract and of which he had the possession, anid during
the time of such possession only. Upon the particular
point as to the rights of the appropriater of water in a
stream he says: "The position that the first occupant
of water, for a bereficial purpose, has good title to
it., is true in the sense that no one can pen back the
water nor divert it. In this, as in other cases of in-
jury to real property, possession is good title against
a wrong doer. It appears to us that there is no authority
in our law, nor so far as we know, in the Roman law, that
the first occupant has any right to deprive other ovners
of land upon the same body of water, of the special ad-
vantages of the natural flow thereof. The principle de-
duced from this case seems to be that a ripar lan owner
gains no additional or more extensive rights in a
body of water to the detriment of others on the same,
by being the first to apply the water to a beneficial
use. His rights depend upon his riparian ownership,
and his prior appropriation is but the exercise of a
pre-existing right. If he exceeds his privelege as such
riparian owner, he usurps other rights and unless con-
tinued so long as to raise the presumption of a grant,
it gives him no additional rights in the water. The only
practical advantage he gains by such prior appropriation
is that in case of a disturbance of his right, his dam-
ages will be measured by his beneficial use. To the
same effect is Holker vs. Perritt, Law Reports, 10
Ex. 59. It should be said, however, that as soon as a
person has appropriated water to a beneficial use, he
may sue for any injury done to him respecting such new
use. Entry vs. Owen, 6 Ex. 352.
It seems to be settled beyond a doubt that the early
English doctrine never gained a foothold in the United
States, and it is well settled that mere prior occupancy
or appropriation of the waters of a stream by a ri-
parian owner, can give no exclusive right thereto as
against others on the same stream, with the following
exceptions in some of the States: 1. Unless the prior
occupation is continued for such a length of time as
to raise the presumption of grant. Davis vs. Fuller,
12 Vt. 178. 2. Where the common law has been modified
by some local custom, usage, or statutory enactment, as
for instance, the Massachusetts mill acts. As sustain-
ing the general American doctrine, see Palmer vs. Mul-
ligan, 2 American decisions, 270. Platt vs. Johnson, 15
Johns. 213; Norton vs. Bigelow, 16 American Decisions,
696; Tillman vs. Tilton, 5 N.H. 231; Parker vs. Hotch-
kiss, 25 Conn. 321; Dennett vs. Kellar, 29 Mich. 420;
Angel on Water Courses Sec. 134 and 350; Pomeroy on
Riparian Rights, Sec. 6.
It will hardly be necessary to go into a detailed
examination of all these very early cases, as they have
the same general tendency, and I will therefore select
one or two of the leading cases. In Palmer vs. Mulligan,
supra, a leading case upon this subject, the facts were
as fol ows: Plaintiff brought an action for damages
claimed to have been sustained to his mill dam by the
erection by the defendant of another miii above his, and
thus diverti.ng the water. Held, the act of erecting the
mill by defendant was a lawful act, and though it in-
jured the plaintiff, he was without remedy. Each one had
an equal right to buiild his mill, and the enjoyment of
it will not be restrained because of sonie inconvenience
to the other; and this case emphatically rejects the
doctrine that the person erecting the first mill thereby
acquired any superior rights upon the same body of water.
In Tyler vs. Wilkerson, supra, a case arising out of
a similar state of facts; in the opinion, Story J.,
says: "Of a thing common by nature, there may be an ap-
propriation by general consent or grant. Mere prior
appropriation of water without such consent or grant,
confers no exclusive right. It is not like the case
of mere occupancy, where the first occupant takes by
force of his priority of occupation. That supposes no
ownership already existinF- and no right of use already
acquired. But our law annexes to the riparian proprieters
the right to the use in common, as an incident to the
land, and whoever seeks to found an exclusive use must
establish a rightful appropriation in some manner ad-
mitted by the law, which may be either by grant from
all the proprieters whose interests are effected, or by
long exclusive enjoyment without interruption, which
affords a just presumption of right; and it is well
settled that as prior occupancy or use of water does
not give exclusive possession, so a man does not lose
any of his rights in a stream by mere non-user, nor
does such non-user confer any adverse rights upon ano-
ther." See also Townsend vs. McDonald, 12 N.Y. 381.
From an examination of the cases cited, I think we
can with safety Jay down the following, as the doc-
trine of both England and the United States . The wa-
ters of streams and inland lakes and ponds, are common
alike to the use of all riparian proprieters upon its
borders. This extends to lakes wholly inland and ter-
ritorial. Each proprieter may use the water for all
reasonable purposes, provided that he does not inter-
fere with the public easement of navigation, in all
lakes and streans navigable. But he must after its use,
return it without substantial diminution in quantity
to its natural bed or channel before it leaves his own
land, so that it may reach the adjacent proprieters in its
natural condition . No priority of use or occupation
can give him any higher or more extensive rights that
these, as against other proprieters higher or lower
upon the stream, or abutting upon either side of him,
upon the shores of the lake. More extensive or exclusive
rights than these against other riparian owners, can
only be acquired by grant from them, or by prescription,
which presupposes a former grant. See Smith vs. Roches-
ter, 92 N.Y. 463. However, the doctrine above stated
as to the rights of riparian owners, does not apply
to the vast fresh water lakes or inland seas of this
Country, nor to the streams forming the boundary of the
States.
It will be remembered that I gave two exceptions
to the rule that priority of appropriation gives no su-
perior rights. The second exception was where it is
modified by local custom or some statutory enactment.
The best example of the latter is in Massachusetts. From
a very early period in that state, statutes have existed
providing for the encouragement of mill s, the effect
of which has been to modify somewhat the rights of ri-
parian owners. These statutes authorize one having a
mill site upon his lands to flow the lands of other
proprieters on the same body of water for the purpose
of getting power sufficient to run his mill. The
effect of these statutes seems to have given the ri-
parian owner who first appropriates the water of a
stream to mill purposes, the right, by virtue of this
priority, to maintain his dam against others, although
it may prevent the erection of mills by them. Carey vs.
Daniels, 41 American Decisions, 532. Gould vs. Water Co.
13 Gray 442. This exclusive right must be reasonable,
however, and this superiority of right exists only to
the extent of the actual appropriation and use. The
unappropriated residue may be the subject of a new
appropriation by others; but the later decisions of
that State have so limited the doctrine as to make it
difficult to discover any essential difference between
it and the ordinary rule. In Ellen vs. R. R. 10 Cush.
193, it is laid down that each riparian owner has a
right to a just and reasonable use of the water which
flows through his land, and so long as he does not
wholly divert or appropriate it, or does not appropriate
any more than is reasonable, other riparian proprieters
cannot complain; and in Thurber vs. Morton, 2 Gray 352,
it is said in determining what is a reasonable use, a
just regard must be had for the force and volume of the
water and the state of improvement of the Country, and
general usage in similar cases. Maine and Minnesota
have statutes similar to these, and similar doctrines
prevail there. It is to be borne in mind that these
rules are peculiar to the States mentioned, and are
solely the result of statutes and are not recognized in
other states. With this, I think, we have discussed
the question as to title to waters of a lake or pond, and
have shown that mere priority of appropriation, as such,
between riparian proprieters, gives no exclusive rights
or priveleges. We will now pass to a discussion of the
question as to the title to land under lakes and ponds
as between riparian proprieters.
CHAPTER II.
In discussing this question, it naturally falls
into two divisions: 1. Title to the beds of the lake or
pond, and, 2. Lakes and ponds as boundaries; but as the
first naturally leads into the second, they will be
discussed in one Chapter.
In considering this head, there will be found a
great diversity of opinion, especially in the United
States, while in England the question does not seem to
have been given much attention; in fact, in some respects
it may still be considered as an open one. This may
not seem so strange, as England proper contains but few
strictly non tidal lakes, and they are of small impor-
tance. The question regarding the rights of the Crown to
the land under lakes, seems to have first come up in
1863 in the case of M1arshall vs. Navigation Co., 3 Best
and Smith, 732. The plaintiff in this case was the pos-
sessor of a right of fishing by grant in certain parts
of Wellswater Lake, in the north of England. The de-
fendant company, being incorporated for the excursion
business, started to run their steamboats on the lake,
and did so for a time. The lake being shallow in places,
the steamboat company, by allowing their vessels to
dump their ashes, cinders, refuse etc. in the water,
eventually drove the fish away. Defendant justified on
the ground that the lake was a public highway and that
they navigated by license obtained from the riparian
owners along shore. In considering the case, Wightman L,
says! "Whether the soil of lakes, like that of fresh
water rivers prima facie belongs to the owner of the
lands, or of the manor on either side of it, or belongs
prima facie to the King, in the right of his preroga-
tive, it is not necessary to deternine. It is clear,
however, that the soil of the land, covered 1ith water,
may together with the water and right of fishing therein,
be especially appropriated by a 1,hird person whether
he have the land or not, adjacent thereto on the bor-
ders thereof." Accordingly the question stood in this
condition until 1878, when the case of Bristow vs.
Cormican, Law Reports 3 Appeal cases 643. Plaintiff
here claimed the right to fish extending over the whole
of Lake Lough, one of t' e largest non-tidal lakes in
Ireland, including a place where it was claimed defen-
dant trespassed. Plaintiff based his claim upon a
grant from Charles II. in 1660 and upon certain leases
since made by persons claiming title iunder the grant.
It was positively laid down in this case that the Crown
has no de jure right to the soil or fishings of an in-
lanmd non-tidal lake, and a general grant by the crown of
a right of fislaing in a lake is not, without more, suf-
ficient to establish title thereto; and t where there is
no evidence of acts of possession by the grantee at the
particular point in dispute, can have no effect. There
is no authority to show that the Crown is of common right
entitled to land covered by water, where the water is not
running water forming a river, but still water forming
a lake. While these cases do not establish much one
way or the other regarding the particular point in
question, they do establish two propositions which are
not fully recognized in this Country. 1. That the title
to the bed of a lake or pond is not in the soverign au-
thority. 2. That the bed of a lake and the shore which
bounds it, is susceptible of distinct ownership by dif-
ferent persons.
In coming to the question in the United States, it
becomes one of vast importance, especially in those
States which, like New York, are dotted throughout their
borders by lakes large and small. Whether the line of
low water mark or high water mark is to be considered as
a boundary, is a question as to which there are differ-
ences of opinion throughout the States. If the bank ow-
ners do not own the bed, it must be conceded that it is
owned by the State. Wherever the United States was the
original owner, the right passed to the State on its
admission to the Union, with all other rights pertaining
to eminent domain. Whether the state owns it as pro-
prieter or only as soverign, is, perhaps, one of the
main points. If it owns the soil as proprieter, it may
sell it for private improvement and occupation, and the
bank owner may be cut off from any use of the water in
connection with his estate, and be deprived of the bene-
fits which he had reason to suppose he had acquired
absolutely by his purchase. But if the State owns it as
soverign merely, under the right of eminent domain, it is
to be preserved as a right of navigation, merely for the
common enjoyment of all the people. Where lakes are taken
possession of under the power of eminent domain, ques-
tions of property rights connected therewith are bound
to arise. In those states where the gathering and storirg
of ice for use in summer and for shipping away is car-
ried on, the question is one of great practical impor-
tance.
It may for a moment be profitable to discuss the
great navigable lakes in the United States, or as they
are more properly called, the great inland seas. As to
the shores of the sea and rivers as far up as the tide
ebbs and flows, the common 2aw of England provided that
the ownership of lands went to the high water mark, and
no further. The shore proprieters had certain rights
termed riparian, but his title stopped where the sea
began, or at that point where the highest tide carried
the water, and the Crown owned the strip subject to over-
flow by the tide; but as to fresh water streams, not
navigable, the title of the proprieter on either side
extended to the middle or thread of the stream.
In this Country the great lakes are regarded as
public property, and not susceptible of private owner-
ship any more than the sea. 3 Kent's Commentaries, 429.
In Canal Appraisers vs. The People, 17 Wend. 571, in
the opinion it is said: "A different rule than that of
the common law must prevail as to our large navigable
lakes, which are mere inland seas, though there is
neither ebb nor flow of the tide, and also as to those
lakes and streams which foyti the natural boundaries
between us and a foreign nation. Our own local law
appears to have assigned the shores down to the low
water mark, to the riparian owners, and the beds of
the lakes to the public." It is made to differ from a
sea boundary because the space between high and _Jow
water mark on the ocean is subject to the overflow by
the tides, and is therefore useless for all purposes
of agriculture; but the great lakes have no tides, and
the difference between high and low water mark is not
periodical, and although they do sometimes overflow
their banks, the waters recede again, and only overflow
at long and irregular intervals, so that in the mean
time the land can be used for tillage and pasture. R.R.
vs. Valentine, 19 Barb. 484. But in Ledyatrd vs. Ten-
Eyck, 36 BarU. 102, it is held that a Pike five miles
in length and one mile in width would pass under a
grant of a large tract of land which included it within
its boundaries, and in Wheeler vs. Spinola, 54 N.Y.377,
it was held that the rule that proprieters of land bor-
dering upon streams of water in which the tide ebbs
and flows own only to high water mark, is not appli-
cable to a case where; by cutting a channel between a
pond and a body of salt water, the water of the former
becomes salt and the tide ebbs and flows therein. In
such case the rights of the riparian proprieters are
not affected thereby.
We will now pass to a discussion of the small er
lakes and ponds, in which we have a variety of hold-
ings.
The question regarding the smaller lakes and
ponds in this State, with regard to the boundaries of
the riparian proprieters thereon, may still in some re-
spects, by regarded as an open one. Lands under the
waters of navigable lakes seem to be placed on the
same footing as lands under the water of navigable
rivers, and it requires a specific grant to enable the
riparian proprieter to go beyond the shore. Canal Co.
vs. People 5 Wend. 427. It may be said that by Statute
in New York, ( 1 Rev. Stat. 573), the State's title
to land under navigable waters is held in trust for
the owners of the up-land as well as for the public,
and the State can only convey the lands under such
waters, whether lakes or tide-waters, to the owner of
the adjoining land. See also Rumsey vs. R.R. 114 N. Y.
423; Wright vs. Eldred, 46 Hun 12.
It is hard to lay down a rule as to where the line
shall be drawn. What lakes shall be treated as coming
within the settled rule, and what as being within the
rule applying to fresh water streams. Are you to fol-
low the rule in the case of the Great Lakes, and stop
at the low water mark, or take the rule as applied to
streams, and carry the proprieter's line to the center.
Navigability can hardly be said to be a fair test, for
all ponds, even, are more or less navigable. When the
State makes a grant of land which includes within its
bounds the whole of a pond or lake, of course it grants
to the individual the bed of the lake. Ledyard vs. Ten
Eyck, supra. But if the grant is bounded by the lake,
the line could hardly be carried further than the mar-
gin, as the rule protecting the State from any impli-
cation in its grant would produce this result. Now let
us take a case for instance, where a grant of land is
made including a lake as large as lake George in this
State, or Oneida Lake, or any of the lakes in the
central part of this State, midway in size between the
Great Lakes and the smaller ones. Now conceding to the
grantee ownership in the bed of the lake, how are his
deeds bounded by the bed of the lake, to be construed.
Does his title extend to the water line or further ?
If further, where will the boundary be. There is no
stream; there can, therefore, be no ownership as at
common law under fresh water rivers. In this case,
necessity would compel the application of the rule as
adopted it, R. R. Co. vs. Valentine, to wit, lands bor-
dering upon a lake go to low water mark; but this rule
requires that ownership of the b .d of the lake should
be held subservient to the title to its shores. The land
owners title goes to the water; if it gradually sub-
sides, as it does in almost all lakes, the shore owner's
line gradually enlarges, and he cannot therefore, be
cut off from the Lake by a grant to another person. His
boundary line is always the water, so that it may be
said that there is a covenant running with the land that
the grantor will hold the title to the bed of the lake,
subject to the right of the shore owner always to be
bounded by its waters; as it shrinks in size, the shore
owner's estate increases by accretion. The grantor can-
not do what the State asserts its right to do respecting
lands bounded by the sea or the great rivers, to wit,
sell the strip between high and low water mark; because
any attempt to use the land under water in front of a
shore owner's parcel, would conflict with his boundary,
or else limit his rights as a riparian owner. Now while
the shore owner is bounded by the pond or lake, he rmst
have certain definite and ascertained rights, according
to this rule. He is entitled to free access to his boun-
dary line, the water. He has the exclusive right of access
to the water over his own land, and if he can make it
useful to him for any purposes of navigation he may
do so. He may fish and cut ice upon it. These are the
rights incident to his boundary line, bought and paid
for when he pays for the land, and ought not to be taken
from him even under the right of eminent domain, without
compensation. These are rights which are appurtenant
to the land, and cannot be taken away. While there
is no positive authority in New York, settling the
question regarding very small lakes, the decided weight
of authority tends to support the rule as here given.
These deductions, however, as here laid down, are per-
haps incompatible with the right claimed by the State
to sell to strangers the land between high and low water
mark. In the case of small lakes, there is no such strip
of land; the shore owner's title going to the water.
We hawe seen that it would be incompatible to the shore
owner for the proprieter who had sold to him, to sell to
another land under the water, and the person so purchas-
ing would take only subject to the rights of the owner of
the shore. But even allowing that seperate ownership
of the bed and the shores exists, what is the result ?
The riparian owners have the right to build docks out to
the line of navigability, and they cannot be cut off
from access to the water. What title then, can a stran-
ger take to land under the water ? He takes simply the
bare title, with all the rights connected with ownership
granted away. The land acquired is covered with water,
which cannot be made useful to him, and the condition
of his tenancy is that is shall so remain covered With
water, for in just proportion as it ceases to be so cov-
ered, it ceases to be his. Therefore it will be seen
that whether the owner of the shore be bounded by the
lake, as is upheld by this rule, or be held to own the
bed of the lake, there is but ver' little difference
in his rights or the value of his holding. Perhaps, if
anything, his dominion oVer the water is more perfect
when he is bounded by it, than if hu should be held to
own the fee in the land beneath its surface. He may
fish the whole lake under a sort of ccrrion right of
piscary, created by owning the lands upor its borders,
while if his right depended upon the ownership of the
soil beneath the water, he would be limited to that part
of the lake the soil of which was within his bounds.
His ri'ht to cut ice is a common right which he has
with the other shore proprieters. If his right to
cut ice depended upon his title to the bed of the lake,
he would be strictly confined within his own lines.
There is a very close analogy between the small lakes
and the old [1nglish common lands. The common lands
were not for the use of the public in general, except
where".prescription has established a highway across
them, but for the use of the tenants of the manor, and
the right to use them was strictly appurtenant to the
tenancy of other lands held in severalty. With the
march of population, it has become necessar to divide
these lands, and destroy the right of canmon use in
them. In such cases the vested rights of the tenants
of the manor have been extinguished by purchase. Should
any of these small lakes, therefor e, be taken under the
right of eminent domain, compensation would have to be
made to the shore proprieter. It must be borne in mind,
however, that a grant of land, which included expressly
the bed of the lake, would of aourse vive the grantee an
estate in the land under the water. I have endeavored
to collect all the authorities in New York state, which
Wi ] be found to throw any light upon this matter:
Appraisers vs. People, 5 Wend. 1; Ledyard vs. TenEyck,
36 Barb. 102; Canal fund vs. Kendall, 26 Wend. 418;
R.R. vs. Valentine, 19 Barb. 484; Kingman vs. Sparrow,
12 Barb. 201; "'organ vs. Kine, 35 N.Y. 454; and in
gerL ral, see Dillingham vs. Smith, 30 Maine 370; Strange
vs. Biermujler, 34 Ohio 492; Payne vs. Woods 1.01 Mass.
160; and Angell on Water-courses, 41 - 43.
We will now proceed to discuss the rule as it is
found in the different states. Owing to the length of
this thesis, I will not attempt to give a detailed ac-
count of the rule in each State, but will simply pick
out one or two of the leading cases.
In Fletcher vs. Phelps, 28 Vt. 257, it was held
that lands bounded on Lake Champlain and upon the streams
which empty into that body of water, and ordinaril., main-
tain the same level as the waters of the lake, extend
to the edge of the lake at low water mark; but in a
later case, Austin vs. R.R. 45 Vt. 205, it was held
that the bank owner, in the case of small lakes and
ponds, has no appurtenant right in the water which
will enable him to maintain ejectment agEinst one who
would take possession, and fill in and occupy the bed
of the ;ond below the wter line in front of him.
In Illinois, a deed of land in which one boundary
was described as following the course or" Lake i[ichigan
was held to bound the land by the line at which the
water usually stands when free from disturbinr causes.
Seaman vs. Smith, 24 Ill. 52]. This rule is followed
in Ohio, with a reservation in regard to the rights
of the riparian owner to build out beyond his strict
boundary line for the purpose of affording such con-
venient walls and landing places in aid of commlerce, as
do not obstruct navigation. Sloane vs. Biermuller, 34
Ohio State 492.
In Wisconsin the, boundary is held to be the ordin-
ary low boundary line, but with appurtenant water rights.
The Court says; in Delaplaine vs. R R. 42 Wis. 425:
"But while the riparian proprieter only takes to the
water line, it by no mea-ns follows that he can be de-
prived of his riparian rights without corpensation.
These are private rights, incident to the ownership of
the shore which he possesses distinct from the rest of
the public. All the facilities which the location of his
land with reference to the lake affords, he has the
right to enjoy for the purposes of gain or pleasure. It
is evident from the nature of the case, that these
rights of user and exclusion are connected with the
land itself, grow out of its location, and cannot be
materkvlly abridged or destroyed without inflicting an
injury upon the owner whi.ch the law should redress. It
may be remarked tirat these riparian rights are not
common to the citizens at large, but exist as incidents
to the right of the soil itself, adjacent to the water.
In other words, according to the uniform doctrine of the
best authorities, the foundation of riparian rights is
the ownership of the bank or shore. In such ownership
they originate. They exist though the fee of the lake
be seperate from the ownership of the shore. If the pro-
prieter owns the bed of the stream or lake , this j,,a., pos-
s'-bly give him some additional rights; but his riparian
rights do not depend upon that fact, strictly speaking."
In Michigan, we come to the first radical diversion
from the general line of authorities. In Rue vs. Rud-
dington, 10 J'ich. 125,it was held that the rule appli-
cable to Lake M-uskegon, a smatll lake separated from
Lake M4ichigan by an outlet only, is, that the ownership
of the land bou nded upon the lake carries with it the
ownership of the land under the water, and in the
later case o- Clute vs. Fisher, 65 Hich. 48, it was
held that the owner of a subdivision of land upon an
inland lake, owns the soil under the water of such
lake, which would be included within the subdivision if
its lines were fully extended. But the practical dif-
ference between this ruling and that of Wisconsin is
not so great as might at first seem, because if the
bank over is the proprieter of the bed also, he is
limited in the use of it only by the public right; if
not proprieter of the bed, he Viay still make use of it,
limited only by the general pi-blic right of navigation.
The State or proprieter cannot either by regulation or
sale, take from him his appurtenant rights in the water,
or in the navigation thereof, without compensation.
In Wisconsin it is also held that the rule of bank
ownership is the same, whether the water is susceptible
of navigation or not. Boorman vs. Sunnocks, 42 Wis.233.
Nevertheless, if accretions are fo-med on the shore of
a non-navigable pond or lake by slow and imperceptible
degrees, or if the bed is uncovered by the Eradual re-
ceding of the waters, the land thus made or uncovered,
belongs to the proprieter of that which adjoins it.
Therefore if a lake or pond gradually disappears alto-
gether, the adjoining proprieters will become owners of
the whole bed, and vould find their possessions increased
several times the original size. Jones vs. Johnson, 18
Howard 156. Also see Belding vs. State, 25 Ark. 120;
MUlnlicipality vs. Cotton press, 18 La. An. 122; and
Hodgers vs. Belden 95 No. Cal. 331. But the question
as to the gradual or slow disappearance of the waters is
not such an important matter, for generally the lakes
and ponds gradually recede if at all, and whether under
the exceptional ruling ,as in Michigan and one or two
other states, or the general holding of ctll the juris-
dictions, their beds come at last to be private property
without any grant from the State.
Maine holds in accordance with the New York doc-
trine, although not without a conflict in her decisions,
In the early case of Bradley vs. Rice, 13 Maine 198,
it was held that where a lake had been raised by arti-
ficial means, so as to permanently extend beyond its
natural limits, a grant of land bounded by the lake
should be limited by its artificial margin, in its pre-
sent condition, or as it existed at the time of the
conveyance. Later, in Wood vs. Kelly, 30 Maine 47,
4 i upon a similar statement of facts it was
held -that a grant bounded by the lake included all the
land which was uncovered when the wtter was at its low-
est.
Indianna seems to have gone the farthest of any of
the states holding adversely to the general rule. In
Turner vs. Rice 121 Ind. 51, it was held that non-navi-
gable lakes must Ie brought within the comtimon law rule
regardingA navigable streams, and purchasers take title
to the center. In Ridgeway vs. Ludlow, 58 of Ind. 48,
it was laid down that title by adverse possession to
land bordering upon a lztk.e gives title to the center.
Ohia also holds with Indiana and Michigan, although
not without strong dissent, and the rule may be re-
garded as not well settled either way. In Lemback vs.
Nywe, 8 L.R.A. 227, it was held that wh-re one oivns a
tract of land which surrounds a lake, and conveys a
part bordering thereon, the presump-ion is that the
t tle of the purchaser extends to the center thereof.
Two judges, however, dissented in this case.
In New Jersey they apply the somewhat exceptional
test, thmt of the ebb and flow of the tide, to deter-
mine whether waters are private or public.
In some of the western states, notably Nevada
and Colorado, it is laid down that the doctrine of the
modern riparian rights is imsuited to the condition of
the country, and the rights of the adjoining proprie-
ters are to be determined by the application of the old
doctrine of prior appropri-tion. Reno vs. She-nman, 4
L.R.A. 60 and 767.
I think, from a reading of the foregoing cases,
that the prevailing doctrine in this Country, regaTIed as
particularly applicable as to large lakes, and qualified
somewhat in the case of artificial ponds, to be as fol-
lows: That While a general grant of land on a river or
stream which is riot navigable extends the line of the
grantee to the middle or thread of the current, a
grant to a natural pond or lake extends only to the
water's edge, and this rule has the dupport of the fol-
lowing states: New York, 11aine, New Hampshire, Wis-
consin, Illinois, Vermont, Massachusetts ard Con-
necticut. In Pennsylvania a pond or small lake is con-
sidered an entirety, the whole or none of it being pri-
vate - roperty. Reynolds vs. Commonwealth, 93 Penn. 458.
CHAPTER III.
RIPARIAN RIGHTS.
Riparian rights, according to the strict meaning of
the term, are such as follow or are connected with the
ownership of the banks of streams, rivers, or lakes.
Those whose lands border upon tide waters are called,
littoral proprietecs, and there appears to be no word
of sufficiently7 broad meaning to include both riparian
and littoral, although each is sometimes used to denote
the other. The distinction between tide waters and
fresh, or between public and private waters is not nec-
essarily a material question in dete-mnining questions
relating to riparian rights, since riparian rights pro-
per depend upon the ownership of lands contiguous to the
water and are the same whether the proprieter of such
lands owns the soil under the water or not. Go1-id on
Waters, Sec. 145. It is of course necessary for the
existence of a riparian right, that the land should
come ill contact with the water, but lateral contact is
as good as vertic-1l. Casemore vs. Richards, 7 House of
Lords cases 349.
In discussing these rights they fallunder two
heads; I. Private rights; 2. Public rights, or those
gained by custom and long usage. The private rights
are divided into (]) Access; (2) Right to cut and take
ice; (3) Wharfage; (4) Fishing; (5) Accretion. Public
rights are divicied into (1) Navigation, and, (2) The
quasi public right of fishing, in several of the states.
The leading case upon the question of access is
that of Delelaplaine vs. R.R. 24 Am. Ren. 386. A rail-
road company .n this case constructed its road to Lake
Monona, a navigable body of water in Wisconsin. By doing
so they cut off the riparian owners from access to the
lake, and left in front of their land a pool of stagnant
water. It was contended by the company that because it
was authorized by its charter to construct its road be-
tween two certain points, it had the right to occupy, in
the construction of its road-bed, any land in the state
between these points. By the Court: "It may be conceded
that the company had the right by its charter, to occupy
the bed of the Lake in the construction of its road;
but this does not imply an interitior cn the part of the
leLislat1;re to relieve the company from its liability in
case of injuryr to a riparian owner. The legislature
douibtless intended that the company, in the execution
of its chartered power, would make compensation for any
damage inflicted upon any land owner, where liability
was imposed at commor, law. The act of the railroad in
constructing its road, plainly shows an interference
with a natural flow or action of the water, an obstruc-
tion of access to and from the lots of the plaintiff to
the body of the lake. It is therefore, a permanent in-
jury to the property, and a reduction of its market
value. We are at a loss to understand why the plaintiff
should not recover such damages for this infringement
upon and destruction of his riparian rights, as he may
prove he has actually sustained. These riparian rights
are undoubted elei'ents in the value of property thus
situated. If destroyed, can anyone claim that the plain-
tiff has not suffered a special damage in respect to his
property, different both in degree and kind, from that
sustained by the general public". This case is also
in accordance with the English line of decisions upon the
subject; see Lyon vs. Fish Monger's Co. Law Rep. L App.
Cases, 662. Also Steamship Co. vs. ngine Co. 12 R.I.
348; Brisband vs. R.R.Co. 23 M1inn. 114; Yates vs. Mil-
waukee, 10 Wall. 497.
On the other hand, the ver'y early case of Gould
vs. R. R., C N.Y. 522, w'1vich was decided prior to
Yates vs. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497, held that as the
owners of land joining a navigable river have no right
of property in its waters, or in its shores below
high water mark, they are not entitled to compensation
where a railroad constructed under a grant from the
legislature cuts off all communication between such
lands and the river. It is claimed that this doctrine
resulted in New York from the civil law doctrine, applt-
cable to the Hudson, which was the river in question.
This doctrine which rests upon the ground that the in-
jury suffered by the riparian owner, though greater in
degree, is the same in kind as that sustained by the
general public, and by those who not being riparian
owners, have occasion to approach the river over that
part of the bank occu pied by the road. This doctrine is
sipported by Tomlin vs. R.R. 32 Iowa 106, Strauss vs.
R.R. 34 N.J.Tjaw 532.
Where it is conceded however, that riparian rights
are property rights, the question of their taking without
being corpensated for, is well settled; and it riy be
said that the early case of Gould vs. R. R. has been so
encroached upon by later decisions in New York that it
can hardly be said to be of much authorit at the pre-
sent day, or at least very doubtful. Strong vs. R.R. 90
N.Y. 122.
The right of riparian owners upon navigable rivers
and lakes, to construct in shoal waters in frontof
their land, walls, piers, landings etc. in aid of nav-
igation, is so well settled it hardly needs much space.
This right, however, is always subject tc. the qualifica-
tion that the structures must not pass beyond the point
of navigability. It is held to be a riparian right,
not dependant upon title to the bed, but upon title to
the bank. Its exercise may be regulated or prohibited
by the State, but so long as it is not prohibited it is a
private right, derived from a passive or implied license
by the public. Gould on waters, Sec. 179.
The right of fishing may depend to a great extent
upon the question whether the ownership of the bed of
the lake or pond is in the state or the bank o-ers,
therby becoming either public or private. It is gener-
ally held that the right of fishing follows the owner-
ship of the bed. If that is in the state, the fishing
is public, if not, it belongs to the bnk proprieter.
Beekman vs. Kramer, 44 Ill. 447. In Cobb. vs. Davenport,
33 N.J. 369, the whole subject is very fully considered,
and it is held that while the right of fishing is prima
facie, exclusively in te owner of the soil, yet it is
not inseperable therefrom, but muy be acquired distinct
from the ownership of the land beneath the lake, and
the fact that the public in general, for a long period
of time, were accustomed to fish in a certain lake
without molestation, simply tends to establish a cus-
tomary right in all the inhabitants in that locality to
fish in these waters, if a right to fish could be es-
tablished by proof of custom; but the right of fishing
is not a mere easement or right of user without derog-
ation of the property; but as a profit or a taking of the
property itself. Therefore, the right of fishing cannot
be claimed by custom, but must be prescribed for in a
"Que" estate, (The term Que estate, as used here, is a
term used in pleading, particularly in claiming pescrip-
tions, by which it is alleged that the plaintiff and
those former owners whose estate he has, have iimem-
oriably exercised the right claimed. Black's Law Dic-
tionary. In other words, if one claims a prescriptive
right to an easement in another's lands, b.' reason of
owning or occupying land to which such right is appur-
tenant, he is said to claiyu a Quo estate, and it is
only in this forrq that a claim of a profit a prctendre
by prescription can be sustained. Profits a pretendre
differ from an ease-'rent, in that the fomier ar; rights
of profit, and the latter are mere rights of convenience
without profit.)
Upon the question of the right to cut and take
ice, the rules conflict sorewhat. In a few of the states
it is governed by the same rules applicable to fishint_.
il].river vs. Smith, 34 Conn. 462; Lorman vs. Benson,
8 1,Tich. 18. It is a question of as great importanice,
pe:,rhps, as any regarding riparian rights, and will
therefore bear little detail discussion. It ,-qa- be
laid dova- as a fundamental rle, that the owner of an
easement to overflow another's land, is not entitled
to the ice which forms on the water covering the land;
it belongs to the owner of the fee. The owner of a
servient estate has a right to all the profits which
may ar se from the soil, and ra, make such vise of the
soil as is not inconsistent with the easement. A6 was
observed in the leading case of Hydraulic Co. vs. But-
ler, 91 Ind. 134, "NotWithstanding such easement, there
remains with the grantor the right of full dominion and
use of the land except so far as a limiting of their
ownership is essential to the fair enjoyment of the
easement granted. Neither is it necessary that the
grantor should expressly reserve any right which he
may exercise consistentlyi with the fair enjoyment of
the grant. Such rights remain with him because they
are not granted, and for the same reason tle exercise
of any of them cannot be complained of by the grmntee,
who can claim no other limitations upon the rights of
the grantor but such as are expressed in the grant, or
necessarily implied in the right of reasonable enjoy-
ment. Easements do not take from the owner of the fee
the right to make any profitable use he can of his pro-
perty, not inconsistent with the dominent estate. The
right to back or pond water on the land of another,
whether acquired by statute or prescription, gives no
right to the land itself, nor the profits which a use
of, not injurious to the easement, will produce. See
also Paine vs. Woods, 108 Mass. 160; Baker vs. Prick,
45 Md. 339; Mason vs. Hill, 5 B & Ad. 1; Julian vs.
Woodsmall, 82 Ind. 568. In a Maine case it was held
that the owner of a mill dam on a navigable stream,
who did not own the b.d of the stream above the dam,
has a qualified interest in the water, but none in the
ice formed ijpon it, and that the riparian owner is the
owner of the ice in such case, though the ice privelege
is made by the flowage. When the owner of a mill darn
maliciously draws the water from a pond, and thus destroys
the ice field, he is liable in damages to the riparian
owner, who owned the land under the pond. Stephens vs.
Kelly, 78 Maine 445. In the earlier case of Dwyer vs.
Morris, 72 Me. 181, it was held that a deed of a tide
mill privelege, mill dam, and wharf privelege, and
the right to flow a creek and adjoining lands, -nd all
rights connected with and belonging to said mill prive-
lege, gave the grantee rio riiht to cut ice nor titl e to
the ice fonried upon a fresh water pond raised by changing
the dam so as to exclude salt water.
In New York, a case of some interest arose upon the
following facts: One S., at the time of bringing the
suit, was the owner of the land upon which the dam in
question was raised, and the land covered by the waters
of the pond, except a small portion owned by 0. 0 by
deed conveyed to the grantor of S. the right and priv-
elege to overflow so much of the land above men'ioned
as is now or at any time after, ma.' be overflowed by
means of the said dam, or by any other dam which may
be erected in place of this one. Later, M and R, of
whom plaintiff was survivor purchased all the ice in
the pond, formed and to be formed, from S. Previous to
the gathering of the ice in the pond, a freshet occurred
which carried away a large part of the ice for ed and
loosened that which was in controversy from the shore,
and wojld probably have swept that out also, had not
plaintiff, by holes cut therein, fastened it to the
shore and thus detained it. After the pihintiff had com-
menced to remove the ice, the defendant went to this part
of the pond over O's land, and by perviission of 0, took
a large quantity of ice, though forbidden by plaintiff,
and also opened a channel across the pond and over
that part of which S had title, and floated the ice so
cut by him through such channel arid gathered and sold
the same. It was held that the plaintiff was entitled to
the ice fonied in the water overflowing the lands of the
owner, and could recover the ice which had been taken
therefrom by a third person by permission of such owner.
It was laid down by the Court that the manner of the
water's use and the mode of its appjication to his own
use, was not restricted by any deed conveying title
which he held, nor by any rule of law except the general
one that the flow of a natural stream shall not be so
obstructed as to deprive owners below of the benefits
of use ard enjoyment . So long as the owners below were
not interfered with, S, plaintiff's vendoras the former
owner of the bqsin which held the water, had the right
to use such water for his own profit. He could use its
momentum to propel machinery, and let that ri&it to othes.
He coild use the water for farm and domestic purposes,
and Iet and rent that ri E-1t to others. All these con-
sequences follow from the act of appropriating them.
The land basin which held them was his, as owner in
fee, or for use. By his dam he had filled the basin,
and the water thus gathered or held there was his,
subject only to the exception that the beneficial en-
joyment of the owners below should not be interfered
with, just as much as if he h ad gathered them for his
own use and benefit in a tank or cistern which had been
constructed for that purpose. The right to use and sell
water Jin its liquid form is only a part of his right.
When the form of the water is changed by cold into ice,
his rights are the same. S., the plaintiff's vendor,
had the riht to use it in its congealed form, and the
same right to sell it and permit it to be gathered be-
fore it returned to its liquid state as he had to use
and dispense it when in the Latter condition. There can
be no difference as to his rights, growing out of the
state of the water. Myer vs. Whittaker, 55 Howard's
Practice, 376, overruling Marshall vs. Peters, 12
Howard's Practice 218.
On the other hand, in Manufacturing Co. vs. Smith,
34 Conn. 462, it is laid down that the owners of a mill
pond own the ice foymed upon it, and the riparian pro-
prieters have no right, as owners of the soil, to remove
it.
Where a person takes the ice in the water over the
land of another, to which the owner of the land has the
exclusive right, the measure of damages in trespass for
such wrongful taking is the value of the ice as soon as
it is a chattel, that is, when scraped, sawed, cut, and
ready for removal.
Public Rights: In certain States, by custom, they
have what is known as common, or quasi-public rights in
lakes and ponds. For instance, in INichigan, it has al-
ways been customary to permrit the public to take fish in
all the small ponds and lakes of the State. Therefore,
in that State it is no trespass, in passing upon ano-
ther's land, to take fish from the lake or pond, unless
the latter has given notice that such conduct will not
be allowed MIarsh vs. ColY , 39 :iich. 626. State vs.
Company etc. 48 N.H. 250. Also see Cobb vs. Davenport,
32 N.J.Law 369, contra. In Ohio it is held that the
right of fishing in Lake Erie and its bays, is not lim-
ited to-the proprieters of the shores, but that the
ritht of fishing in these waters is as public as if they
were subject to the ebb and flow of the tide.

